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Geoff Keey is the political advisor for 
Greenpeace New Zealand and was a member of 
Greenpeace’s international political team at the 
climate change negotiations throughout 2009.
To understand why Copenhagen failed, it 
is important to look behind the publicly 
visible and immediate causes – such as 
incompetent Danish chairing and an 
impracticable negotiating text – to the 
underlying reasons behind the failure.
Why was there a 200-page negotiating text?
During the 2009 UNFCCC (United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change) 
negotiations many countries, New Zealand 
included, seemed unready to negotiate. 
Negotiators lacked a mandate from their 
capitals to consolidate text and come to the 
compromises needed to make progress. 
This lack of a mandate led to the 200-page 
text with its thousands of brackets that 
negotiators faced at Copenhagen.
The two ad-hoc working group 
chairs were able to take the initiative 
to consolidate the text only after the 
threat of a further Danish text emerged 
at Copenhagen.Sadly, this effort was 
sabotaged by the United States during the 
process of handing over the negotiating 
text from the working group on long-term 
co-operative actionto politicians.The US 
ambushed the hand-over process with 
demands and refused to allow the hand-
over to occur until its demands were met. 
After 10 hours of stalemate, the US got its 
way, opening a retaliatory floodgate of 
demands from other countries. The  effect 
of this was to destroy the practicality of 
the negotiating text.
New Zealand’s own strategy was part 
of the problem. New Zealand failed to 
meet the commitment it made in Poznan 
by delaying announcement of its target. 
Then, when asked to provide information 
on the proportion of its target that would 
be met through offsetting, forestry or 
domestic emission reductions, New 
Zealand refused, saying that there were 
too many uncertainties to provide that 
kind of information, despite Environment 
Minister Nick Smith giving projections 
about the emissions trading scheme in 
Parliament.
What did the person on Easter Island say when cutting down 
the last tree? That was a question posed to US academic 
Professor Jared Diamond by a student in a lecture on how 
societies appear to knowingly overshoot their resources.
He referred to the incident in his book Collapse: why 
civilisations choose to fail or survive, which describes a 
string of societal collapses as a result of failing to address 
environmental problems.
Professor Diamond’s book ought to be compulsory 
reading for all the negotiators and politicians and their 
advisers involved in the climate negotiations because they 
are repeating errors Diamond identified in his book: wrong 
values, poor strategic choices and denial.Copenhagen was so 
disturbing precisely because the world’s leaders know they 
face a serious threat to humanity and yet failed to properly 
address it.
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New Zealand’s best contributions in 
2009 were probably when negotiators 
were in UNFCCC chairing roles, rather 
than implementing government policy.
The underlying problems with the 
negotiating texts and the lack of progress 
relate to three main issues.The new 
US administration’s failure to make 
progress in the Senate on climate change 
legislation has meant the US negotiators 
were not ready to strike a deal. This fed 
into the wider lack of ambition from 
developed countries (on both finance and 
targets). This in turn fed into the widely 
differing views of what constitutes a fair 
distribution of effort.
Added to this mix was a marked shift 
in power towards China and its allies in 
the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, 
China, South Africa and India).
The emergence of China
Along with the rest of the BASIC group, 
China is a now a dominant player 
in climate change. Rising emissions 
and a strong economic position have 
given China considerable power in the 
negotiations. Its approach at Copenhagen 
appeared to be driven by the desire to 
preserve development space and avoid 
long-term targets it considers would 
result in an unfair distribution of effort. 
A factor in China’s reticence was anxiety 
over whether low-carbon development 
will deliver the rate of development 
China needs to avoid civil unrest. Lesser 
factors included increasing advocacy 
from climate sceptics and a common 
belief that climate change negotiations 
are a Western plot to constrain China’s 
development.
China’s controversial blocking of 
the 80% by 2050 target for developed 
countries appears based on its concern 
about the level of per capita emissions 
developing countries would be allowed 
under a global goal of 50% cuts by 2050 
and a developed country goal of 80% 
cuts by 2050. China’s assessment is that 
this would allow developed countries to 
pollute at twice the rate of developing 
countries. Put bluntly, why would China 
willingly agree to a long-term path that 
allows its strategic competitors to pollute 
at twice the level of its own citizens?
Long-term comparability, rather than 
external verification of its emissions, may 
be the real bottom line for China which 
might have conceded verification in 
Copenhagen if it had received something 
in return from the US. However, without 
the backing of Congress, President 
Obama had nothing to offer.
The BASIC countries are now 
consolidating their position by proposing 
to fund adaptation for vulnerable 
countries, taking the diplomatic initiative 
from developed countries.
Comparability is a critical issue in climate 
change negotiations 
Three approaches have emerged at 
climate change negotiations during 
year: a justice approach that is based on 
principles of historical responsibility, 
historical debt and an equal share of a 
common resource, for which Bolivia 
is an obvious proponent; a baselines 
approach that compares targets against 
1990 baselines, favoured primarily by the 
European Union; and abatement costs, 
which is favoured by those countries that 
have failed to reduce emissions (such 
as New Zealand and the United States) 
and so have a greater amount of work to 
do to reduce emissions. The UNFCCC 
approach of responsibility and capability 
appears to have slipped off the agenda 
entirely.
Developing country concerns about 
comparability have been exacerbated by 
the low level of ambition of developed 
countries, in terms both of numerical 
targets and the relative amount of 
domestic emission reductions versus 
offsetting through clean development 
and land use, land-use change and 
forestry(LULUCF). Offsetting and 
forestry imply that developed countries 
are deferring structural change to their 
economies and developing countries are 
concerned that offsetting will mean that 
cheaper abatement in their countries will 
be sold to developed countries, leaving 
them with considerably tougher emission 
reductions when it is their turn to take 
on unilateral targets.
New Zealand’s approach of having a 
50% reduction by 2050 and relying almost 
exclusively on offsetting and forestry sets 
a particularly bad example.
Developed countries, for their part, 
are facing political pressure as firms in 
their countries compete with firms in 
developing countries like China and 
India.The opaque political system in 
China exacerbates concerns within 
developed countries that claimed 
emission reductions may not be real.
Ultimately, comparability goes to the 
core of diplomatic gaming at the climate 
change negotiations. Political leaders are 
acting like the proverbial farmers in the 
‘tragedy of the commons’: unless they 
show leadership to put aside some of their 
national interest in favour of the global 
interest, everyone suffers. A common 
understanding of comparable effort may 
be needed to enable leaders to have the 
courage to tackle climate change.
The Copenhagen Accord
On first reading, the Copenhagen Accord 
looks promising. However, the fine print 
on emission reductions and financing 
shows that it is a backwards step from the 
Bali Action Plan.
The proposed developed country 
targets are bottom-up targets.This 
ignores science and undermines the 
UNFCCC process, which is based on 
setting a science-based aggregate target 
Developing country concerns about comparability 
have been exacerbated by the low level of ambition 
of developed countries, in terms both of numerical 
targets and the relative amount of domestic 
emission reductions versus offsetting through clean 
development and land use, land-use change and 
forestry(LULUCF).
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and then agreeing to individual targets that 
will deliver the aggregate.This bottom-
up approach will fail to deliver the kind 
of reductions needed to avoid dangerous 
levels of climate change because countries 
will not be forced into ratcheting up their 
effort.This has been shown in the pledges 
seen to date in the accord, which are at the 
lower end of pledges being proposed in a 
UNFCCC context.
Further, the pledge on short-term 
finance is not what it seems. The British 
government has already admitted that its 
fast-track finance is largely a reclassification 
of existing funding and may include 
money that has already been spent.This is 
likely to be repeated elsewhere.
The long-term financing is also very 
problematic. The pledge itself is very weak, 
merely supporting a goal of mobilising 
finance, with no explicit commitment to 
deliver. The financing is also proposed 
from such a wide variety of sources that 
it is unclear what the $US100 billion per 
annum by 2020might mean in practice.
The UNFCCC has carefully provided 
guidance to countries over the status of 
the accord to ensure parties understand 
that it has no legal weight, and only time 
will tell what weight it has. At the time of 
writing, the BASIC countries have agreed 
to support the accord, but are seeking at 
least five sessions of the ad-hoc working 
groups before COP 16 in Mexico.
Within ASEAN, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Vietnam seem very unlikely to support 
the accord, while Indonesia and Singapore 
are likely to support it. The Philippines 
and Thailand are likely to support the 
accord but only offer aspirational targets. 
A number of other developing countries 
are also likely to associate with the accord 
to access finance, but also only offer 
aspirational targets. The Marshall Islands 
is offering a 40% cut by 2020 to up the 
moral pressure on developed countries.A 
group of Central and South American 
countries, led by Bolivia and Cuba, refuse 
to support the accord, as does Tuvalu. 
Developed countries will almost certainly 
all join the accord.
Challenges for New Zealand
New Zealand will need to be better 
prepared than it was last year. This was 
most publicly reflected in New Zealand’s 
handling of the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting. Prior to the 
meeting, Foreign Affairs Minister Murray 
McCully publicly announced that New 
Zealand didn’t want the time taken up with 
‘Copenhagen issues’, despite clear signals 
that climate change would dominate the 
agenda. At the meeting New Zealand came 
with an offer of agricultural research that 
was so clearly mismatched to the occasion 
that Prime Minister John Key was forced 
into a public u-turn by the other leaders 
present.
There are signs that New Zealand is no 
longer viewed as a serious player in climate 
change negotiations: the United States 
claimed the credit for the agricultural 
alliance in its media release; John Key was 
publicly dropped from a BBC debate at 
Copenhagen and appears to have been 
excluded from the core group negotiating 
the accord; and New Zealand appears to 
have been dropped from a ministerial 
chairing role during the second week of the 
negotiations. All of this occurred despite 
New Zealand being a contributor to the 
Greenland Dialogue.Consequently, New 
Zealand needs to be wary of moves away 
from the UNFCCC process.This move is 
about large countries taking control from 
weaker ones. New Zealand is likely to be a 
loser if the UNFCCC process is sidelined. 
At least at the UNFCCC the country has a 
veto; outside the UNFCCC process, New 
Zealand may be presented with agreement 
text and asked to sign.
New Zealand needs to act on the 
advice of the prime minister and listen 
to vulnerable countries. One of the 
biggest disappointments for me has been 
observing ministers launch into strong 
criticism of countries that are merely 
asking for action needed to enable them 
to survive.If New Zealand risked being 
completely wiped off the map, wouldn’t 
we expect our leaders and diplomats to be 
strident too?New Zealand sends its soldiers 
overseas to kill on lesser provocations.
The global challenge
On the present track the world is headed 
towards at least 3°C warming by the end of 
the century. This has dire implications for 
huge numbers of people. If it happens, it 
will almost certainly be the kind of disaster 
that has befallen past civilisations.
Developed countries will need to face 
up to their responsibilities on both targets 
and financing to build confidence in the 
negotiations. Unless they are willing to 
deliver emission cuts of at least 40% 
below 1990 levels by 2020, major emitting 
developing countries will strongly 
resist taking on commitments. Without 
significant new finance, poorer developing 
countries will have no incentive to take 
action.
Major developing countries will need 
to realise that a right to development 
may well be irrelevant if climate change 
wipes out their capacity for development 
through drought, desertification, salt 
water inundation and other impacts.
The leadership of all countries will 
need to show the courage to find common 
ground on what is their fair contribution 
to a science-based effort to tackle climate 
change. Subordinating scientific evidence 
of likely impacts in favour of short-term 
nationalistic economic gains is the sure 
path to failure.
The deserts of Iraq were once the 
agriculture-driven cradle of civilisation. 
It is a lesson our leaders should never be 
allowed to forget.
There are signs that New Zealand is no longer 
viewed as a serious player in climate change 
negotiations: the United States claimed the credit 
for the agricultural alliance in its media release; 
John Key was publicly dropped from a BBC debate 
at Copenhagen ...
